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The Non-Unconscionability of Condominium
Recreation Leases
BARRY A. MANDELKORN,* MICHAEL H. KRUL,** AND JANICE E.
PODOLL***
The authors evaluate the theory of unconscionability as a
basis for challenging long-term condominium recreation leases
in Florida. They discuss the situation underlying such chal-
lenges and examine recent attempts to apply common law and
U.C.C. unconscionability principles to recreation leases. An
analysis of the realities of condominium development serves to
dispel several commonly held misconceptions about recreation
leases. The authors also analyze the presumption of uncon-
scionability under the Florida Condominium Act, contrasting it
with the proposed Federal Condominium Act. Recognizing the
inefficacy of the unconscionability approach, the authors
briefly discuss the recreation lease buy-out as a more feasible
alternative solution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Condominiums in Florida
In Florida, "real estate" and "condominium developments"
have become virtually synonymous terms. The amount of condo-
minium litigation and the comprehensiveness of the Condominium
Act' evidence the predominant role played by the condominium in
Florida housing and underscore the importance of understanding
that role and the course of its current development.
. A condominium is a form of ownership of real property com-
prising individual units, owned by one or more persons, and an un-
divided share in the common elements appurtenant to each unit.'
Common elements are the portions of the condominium property8
not included in the units.' A corporate entity known as the associa-
tion operates the condominium. 5 The unit owners compose the
membership of the association.' The powers of the association in-
clude the management, maintenance, and operation of the condo-
minium property.7 The association has the power to enter into
agreements and to acquire leaseholds and other possessory or use
interests in lands or recreational facilities.8 Moreover, the declara-
tion of condominium-the instrument by which the condominium
is created-may provide that rentals and fees, along with opera-
tional, replacement, and other expenses arising out of such recrea-
tional facilities, are common expenses 0 incurred by the associa-
tion. The declaration may then make them the subject of
covenants and restrictions," with the association assessing each
unit owner for his portion of the common expenses.
The recreation or long-term lease is the usual instrument by
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 718 (1979).
2. Id. § 718.103(9).
3. "'Condominium property' means the lands, leaseholds, and personal property that
are subjected to condominium ownership, whether or not contiguous, and all improvements
thereon and all easements and rights appurtenant thereto intended for use in connection
with the condominium." Id. § 718.103(11).
4. Id. § 718.103(6).
5. Id. § 718.103(2).
6. Id. § 718.111(1).
7. Id. § 718.111(2).
8. Id. § 718.114. This section of the present Florida Condominium Act incorporates the
1965 amendment which permitted a condominium association to enter into a lease of recrea-
tion or other facilities. 1965 Fla. Laws ch. 65-9.
9. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(12).
10. Common expenses are "all expenses and assessments properly incurred by the asso-
ciation for the condominium." Id. § 718.103(7).
11. Id. § 718.114.
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which the condominium association rents improved property from
the developer or from a third party who has purchased the lease-
hold from the developer as an investment. The recreation lease is a
type of financing device that allows the unit owner to spread out
his payments for the use of the developer's recreation facilities."2
The lease suffers from a drawback, however, because of the re-
quirement of section 718.114 of the Florida Statutes (1979) that
the leasehold be in existence or created at the time of the record-
ing of the declaration of condominium. As a result of this require-
ment, the association typically assumes the recreation lease obliga-
tion at a time when the developer still owns all of the units. The
developer may, then, as an association officer, engage in self-deal-
ing by entering into a personally advantageous recreation contract
on behalf of -the association. Such actions by developers could be
seen as a breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the condominium
association.'8 The recreationally oriented facilities provided by the
lease often include swimming pools, tennis courts, clubhouses, card
rooms, exercise rooms, saunas, and putting greens. Since title re-
mains in the lessor-owner, this improved real propery itself is not a
part of the common elements. 4 The rights, privileges, and obliga-
tions created by the recreation lease, however, are part of the com-
mon elements, as appurtenances that have attached to each unit.
As appurtenances, they are given a protected status under the
Condominium Act: section 718.110(4) prohibits any alteration or
modification of the appurtenances to the condominium unit unless
certain conditions are met, including approval by all other unit
owners.'6 Thus, there is. an intimate relationship between the unit
owners, the association which operates the condominium, and the
recreation lease into which the association enters.
Many recreational leases contain rental escalation clauses. An
escalation clause provides for periodic increases in rent, such in-
12. Lewis & Zenz, Condominium Recreational Leases in Florida 11 (Aug. 30, 1979)
(Star Grant 78-2042, Florida State University).
13. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(1) (1979) provides that the officers and directors of the associa-
tion have a fiduciary relationship to the unit owners.
14. See note 3 supra.
15. Unless otherwise provided in the declaration as originally recorded, no
amendment may change the configuration or size of any condominium unit in
any material fashion, materially alter or modify the appurtenances to the unit,
or change the proportion or percentage by which the owner of the parcel shares
the common expenses and owns the common surplus unless the record owner of
the unit and all record owners of liens on it join in the execution of the amend-
ment and unless all the record owners of all other units approve the amendment.
FLA. STAT. § 718.110(4) (1979).
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creases to be determined by a set standard or formula. The vast
majority of escalation clauses are designed to keep pace with, or at
least minimize, the effects of inflation on their investment return.16
Most escalation clauses in recreational leases are tied into a na-
tionally recognized commodity or consumer price index.17 Thus, at
some stated interval-typically one, three, or five years-the lessee
must pay the lessor an increased rental amount due to the rise in
the cost of living as reflected in the price index. Because recreation
leases usually have long terms of fifty years or more, with terms of
ninety-nine years the most common," escalation clauses take on
great significance for the price of leasing.
In 1975, the Florida Legislature prohibited the inclusion of es-
calation clauses tied to a price index.19 The legislation did not,
however, prohibit fixed price increases stipulated in the original
contract. Nor did the legislature alleviate the burden of the escala-
tion clause on pre-1975 agreements.2 0
The failure of the Florida Legislature to offer relief to unit
owners bound to pre-1975 escalation clause leases has caused the
attention of the public to focus on the recreation lease. Views of
unit owners towards their recreation leases have changed radically
since the first wave of condominium developments with long-term
recreation leases in the mid-1960's 21 To many purchasers at that
16. Often, the lessee must bear the effects of inflation on other costs: under a "net-net-
net" lease, the lessee must pay the property taxes, insurance, and maintenance expenses on
the condominium unit, in addition to the monthly rent. Lewis & Zenz, supra note 12, at 13.
17. Id. at 28.
18. Id. at 13.
19. FLA. STAT. § 711.231 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 718.302(4), .401(8)
(1979)). Section 711.231 provided:
It is declared that the public policy of this state prohibits the inclusion or en-
forcement of escalation clauses in leases [for recreational facilities or other com-
monly used facilities serving condominiums] or management contracts for con-
dominiums, and such clauses are hereby declared void for public policy. For the
purposes of this section, an escalation clause is any clause in a condominium
lease or management contract which provides that the rental under the lease or
fee under the contract shall increase at the same percentage rate as any nation-
ally recognized and conveniently available commodity or consumer price index.
The statute does not, however, prevent the lessor from tying the escalation clause to an
inflation index which may not be nationally recognized, or to an inflation indicator which is
not an index, or from translating his own prognostication of inflation into fixed percentage
increases. For a discussion of the use of index clauses to allocate the risk of inflation, see
Comment, Redistributing the Cost of Inflation, 34 U. MIAMi L. Rav. 301 (1980).
20. Fleeman v. Case, 342 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976); see notes 39-41 and accompanying text
infra.
21. Section 711.121 of the Florida Statutes, enacted in 1965, first allowed attachment of
leasehold interests to the purchase of condominium units.
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time, the lease arrangement appeared advantageous. It enabled
them to use the facilities of the condominium development without
requiring an increased purchase price for the unit itself. Rather
than pay a costly short-term investment outlay for the facilities
themselves, the condominium owner could pay a monthly rental
under a long-term lease. 2
Attacks on recreation leases became prevalent in the late
1960's and throughout the 1970's. The escalation clauses were the
major source of litigation. When these clauses were initially placed
in the lease contract, the Consumer Price Index showed inflation in
the United States averaging less than three percent a year. By the
time the first few rent adjustments came due under the escalation
clauses, annual rates of inflation had almost doubled. 8 Projections
indicated that if the inflation trend continued, lease payments
could double every ten to twelve years.2 4 Indignation kindled as
successive rises in the cost of living caused lessees to pay more
each month to meet their maintenance, insurance, and property
tax obligations, apart from their rental payments under their net-
net-net leases. As the rental payments also increased, unit owners
realized that they could eventually be paying more for their recrea-
tion leases than for their mortgages. Owners began to realize that
liens could be placed on their units by the condominium associa-
tion for nonpayment to the lessor.28
As public attention began to focus on the recreation lease, it
became apparent that the rental amount of many leases was not in
proportion to the quantity and quality of the facilities provided.
Unit owners who did not use recreational facilities chafed at being
statutorily and contractually liable for the monthly payments.2
7 If
22. Lewis & Zenz, supra note 12, at 18.
23. Id. at 23.
24. Id.
25. The association has a lien on each condominium parcel for any unpaid assess-
ments with interest and, if the declaration so allows, for reasonable attorney's
fees incurred by the association incident to the collection of the assessment or
enforcement of the lien. The lien is effective from and after recording a claim of
lien in the public records in the county in which the condominium parcel is lo-
cated, stating the description of the cendominium parcel, the name of the record
owner, the amount due, and the due dates. The lien is in effect until all sums
secured by it have been fully paid or until barred by chapter 95. The claim of
lien includes only assessments which are due when the claim is recorded ....
FLA. STAT. § 718.116(4)(a) (1979).
26. E. SAMUELS, Unit Owner's Viewpoint as to Minimizing Problems of Conflict in
New Developments with Emphasis on Recreational Facilities, in FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON CONDOMINIUMS AND CLUSTER HOUSING 7-7 (1976).
27. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(2) (1979) provides that the liability for assessments may not be
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there had been misunderstandings as to the meaning of the recrea-
tion lease, they existed no longer. Unit owners realized that the
facilities they possessed were actually owned, not by their associa-
tion, which possibly could have responded to pressure by unit own-
ers for relief, but by a third party who expected payment under
the lease no matter what the amount. Resistance mounted and
took the form of legal challenges to the validity of the recreation
lease.
B. The Emergence of a Theory
As individual unit owners and condominium associations be-
gan to challenge recreation leases through legal action, they
searched for a viable legal theory which would provide relief from
the contractual burden of the lease. One of the earliest theories
concerned the wide discrepancy between the value of the facilities
and the cost of the rental. In Fountainview Association, Inc. v.
Bell," several condominium associations contended that they had
a right to recover from the lessor-developers any unconscionable
profit which the developers may have obtained from, among other
things, the lease of certain land to the associations. Plaintiffs ar-
gued that at the time the defendants negotiated the lease with the
condominium association, the defendants were the directors and
officers of the association and fiduciaries for all prospective mem-
bers. The court held that the defendants' activities were not viola-
tive of fiduciary duties, because at the time that the leases were
executed, there were no other members actually belonging to the
condominium association. Accordingly, there was no one toward
whom the developers could act as fiduciaries. The court analogized
these facts to a long line of cases which had held that a corporation
cannot, while its promoters own all of its outstanding stock, re-
quest equitable relief to avoid a purchase of property sold to the
corporation by the promoters at a large profit. In these instances, a
court will deny relief because the rights of innocent purchasers
have not yet arisen2 9
In Wechsler v. Goldman,80 the unit owners sought to cancel or
modify their ninety-nine year recreqtion lease, which the promot-
ers had negotiated with themselves while they were the only mem-
avoided by waiving the use or enjoyment of any common elements.
28. 203 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), cert. dismissed, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968).
29. Id. at 658-59; see, e.g., Lake Mabel Dev. Corp. v. Bird, 99 Fla. 253, 126 So. 356
(1930).
30. 214 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
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bers of the condominium association. The lease returned more per
year to the developers than the assessed value of the leased prop-
erty.3" The lower court stated that although the developer was re-
ceiving exorbitant profits from the leases, it would not grant the
requested relief, because the purchasers had not been harassed
into signing a contract or closing a purchase. The unit owners had
been given notice of the terms of the recreation lease in the condo-
minium documents and lease, both of which were recorded, and in
an abstract containing the documents, which was made available to
all purchasers on request.82 The District Court of Appeal, Third
District, held that the rights of the plaintiffs had been affected by
their knowledge of the lease at closing and by their express accept-
ance of the lease in their closing contracts, notwithstanding the
failure of the developers to inform the plaintiffs sooner that the
lease existed. The court then affirmed on the basis of Fountain-
view, suggesting, however, that what had happened in both of
these cases "may indicate a need for legislative action to amend
the Condominium Act to prevent unfair dealing by promoters of
condominium associations."33 Although the court did not mention
the term "unconscionability" in its opinion, the discussion paved
the way for later unit owners to try to use an unconscionability
theory to defeat their recreation leases.3 4
The Third District denied another attempt to cancel a recrea-
tion lease in Point East Management Corp. v. Point East One
Condominium Corp.38 Citing Wechsler,8 the court held that the
defendants had given full disclosure about the facilities and the
recreation lease. At the time of the sale of the units, the purchasers
had sufficient knowledge concerning the recreation lease to make
an informed decision. Thus, the lease was duly ratified and con-
firmed. 7 The Supreme Court of Florida approved this portion of
the decision."
31. Id. at 744.
32. Id. at 743.
33. Id. at 744.
34. "It is not without some reluctance that we hold the plaintiff condominium associa-
tions do not have a cause for relief against the claimed exorbitant lease rental obligation
imposed on them while both lessor and lessee were owned or controlled by the promoters."
Id.
35. 258 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), affirmed in part, 282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).
36. 214 So. 2d at 741.
37. 258 So. 2d at 325-26.
38. 282 So. 2d 628, 628 (Fla. 1973).
The Point East case also involved the validity of a twenty-five year management con-
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In 1976, the supreme court held in Fleeman v. Case 9 that the
legislative prohibition on escalation clauses tied to national con-
sumer price indices40 could not apply retroactively to contracts en-
tered into before June 4, 1975, the effective date of the statute.1 In
addition, the Fleeman opinion first hinted that there might be a
cause of action for the unconscionability of recreation leases:
Given the narrow issue presented by these appeals we do
not decide questions as to the validity of these leases on any
other grounds. Thus, although there is reference to the possibil-
ity that in some instances lease arrangements for individual unit
owners may be unconscionable, inequitable or contain other de-
ficiencies recognized in law as a basis for judicial invalidation,
these matters are not considered or decided here. 2
These cases reveal that condominium associations, unit own-
ers, and even courts were groping for a theory which could be used
to invalidate unfair recreation leases.4 s In 1976, the supreme court
referred to a cause of action for unconscionability. One of the
tract between the developer and the association. The lower court had invalidated the con-
tract, stating that it violated provisions of the Condominium Act because it diverted control
of the management of the condominiums away from the association. 258 So. 2d at 324-25.
The supreme court, however, quashed the portion 'of the lower court decision which had
invalidated the management contract, holding that the legislature, by placing the power and
duty to manage condominium properties in the condominium associations, did not intend to
restrict the associations' ability to contract for that management. 282 So. 2d at 630.
39. 342 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976).
40. See note 19 supra.
41. 342 So. 2d at 818.
42. Id. Under FLA. STAT. § 672.302(1) (1979), courts may refuse to enforce an uncon-
scionable contract, may enforce it without the unconscionable clause, or may so limit the
application of any unconscionable contract clause as to avoid the unconscionable result.
43. One theory conceived to attack recreation leases was that the leases violated federal
antitrust laws prohibiting unreasonable restraints on trade. Such a theory was attractive
since it opened up the federal courts to the recreation lease challenges and provided an
opportunity to obtain relief including cancellation of leases, treble damages, and attorneys'
fees.
The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice has stated that rec-
reational leases are "not really an antitrust problem." John H. Shenefield, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, wrote that the recreational lease was not part of an unlawful tying ar-
rangement because (1) the purchaser was not being forced to accept any facilities that he
did not want, (2) the facilities were not typically a separate product, but part of the overall
"leisure living" package, (3) the seller-lessor, especially in the "condominium-rich areas of
southern Florida," could not have possessed the requisite market power, and (4) interstate
commerce was not substantially affected. Memorandum from John H. Shenefield, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to the United States Attorney General, re-
printed in SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON CONDOMINIUM AND CLUSTER HOUSING 15-1 (Univer-
sity of Miami Law Center 1977). For a more comprehensive analysis of recreation leases and
antitrust actions see Mandelkorn & Krul, Condominium Litigation, 1977 Developments in
Florida Law, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 875 (1978).
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counts in Avila South Condominium Association v. Kappa Corp."
alleged that parts of the recreation lease were unfair and unreason-
able, and thus in violation of Florida Statutes section 711.66(5)(e).
This section provided, inter alia, that any grant or reservation
made by a condominium association prior to assumption of control
by the nondeveloper unit owners must be fair and equitable. "' The
court held that because the parties had entered into the recreation
lease before the enactment of section 711.66(5)(e), the statute
could not be applied retroactively. The court stated, however, that
"we do not preclude the plaintiffs on remand [from] the possibility
of stating an amended claim of unconscionability, independent of
Section 711.66(5)(e). ' "
In a second action, Point East One Condominium Corp. v.
Point East Developers, Inc.,7 several condominium associations
challenged the validity of a recreation lease, alleging that the lease
was not fair and reasonable and therefore violated the Florida De-
ceptive and Unfair Trade Practice Act'8 and section 711.66(5)(e) of
the Condominium Act.4'9  The Third District, in referring to
Fleeman0 and Avila,"' held that these statutes could not apply
retroactively to a lease entered into before the enactment of the
statutes.2 The court then said, citing Fleeman,'5 that the recrea-
44. 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
45. FLA. STAT. § 711.66(5)(e) (1975) (current version with some modifications at FLA.
STAT. § 718.302 (1979)) provided: "Any grant or reservation made by a declaration or coop-
erative document, lease, or other document, and any contract made by an association prior
to assumption of control of the association by unit owners other than the developer, shall be
fair and reasonable."
46. 347 So. 2d at 605. See Burleigh House Condominium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 368 So. 2d
1316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (cause of action for unconscionability of recreation lease came into
existence on March 31, 1977, the date of the Avila decision; therefore, the statute of limita-
tions for such a cause of action-involving a recreation lease entered into prior to that
date-did not begin to run until March 31, 1977).
47. 348 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
48. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (1979). Under these provisions plaintiffs alleged first that
the lease was unconscionable in that revenues would be collected by the lessor well after he
had no economic interest left in the condominium complex, and that he had sufficient lever-
age to induce unit owners to accept the lease. The rationale for the latter theory was based
on the developer offering the purchaser an item-a condominium unit-with consumer ap-
peal and unique location, price, and facilities. Second, plaintiffs alleged that the lease, when
combined with the sale and resale of condominium units, constituted an unlawful tying
agreement resulting in an unreasonable restraint of trade and the destruction of competition
within the lessees' area of business. 348 So. 2d at 34-35.
49. FLA. STAT. § 711.66(5)(e) (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 718.302 (1979)); see
note 45 supra.
50. 342 So. 2d at 815; see notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra.
51. 347 So. 2d at 599; see notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra.
52. 348 So. 2d at 35-36.
19801
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tional lease could be so unconscionable as to be unenforceable, in-
dependently of those statutes.54 The court remanded the case to
the trial court and directed that the plaintiffs be allowed to amend
the complaint in order to state an independent claim of
unconscionability."
In Cole v. Angora Enterprises, Inc.," the District Court of Ap-
peal, Fourth District, also following Avila, 7 held that the trial
court erred in dismissing a count relating generally to the theory of
unconscionability. The court stated that the trial court should
have given the plaintiff an additional opportunity to amend the
complaint, because the doctrine of unconscionability might provide
a cause of action in suits challenging the enforcement of the recre-
ation lease. 8
At present, Florida courts are experiencing a tremendous in-
crease in the number of suits filed by unit owners trying to avoid
their recreation lease obligations. It appears that the theory of un-
conscionability is one of the few causes of action that the Florida
courts have left open to unit owners. This article will examine the
doctrine of unconscionability as defined under the common law
and by statute and its application to recreation leases. The article
will attempt to refute the various myths surrounding the nature of
the recreation lease and the applicability of the unconscionability
theory to such leases. The recreation lease will be examined from
the perspective of both the consumer-lessee and the developer-
lessor.
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY: THE THEORY
A. Unconscionability Under the Common Law
As far back as 1889, the Supreme Court in Hume v. United
States" defined an "unconscionable" bargain as one "such as no
man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.""
Today, the leading case on the theory of unconscionability is Wil-
53. For the language quoted by the court, see note 42 and accompanying text supra.
54. 348 So. 2d at 36.
55. Id.
56. 370 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
57. 347 So. 2d at 599; see notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra.
58. 370 So. 2d at 1228.
59. 132 U.S. 406 (1889).
60. Id. at 411.
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liams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.6' Walker-Thomas involved
an action by a furniture company to replevy household items that
had been purchased under installment contracts. The contract
terms were printed on a form which provided that a balance re-
mained due on each item until Williams liquidated the balance due
on all items, whenever purchased. Thus, when Williams defaulted
on the payment of one item, the store owner sought to replevy all
items purchased since the first transaction. 2 Williams argued that
the contracts were unconscionable. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia stated that the dual requirements for uncon-
scionability were: (1) absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties, and (2) contract terms unreasonably favorable
to the other party."3 Since the trial court in Walker-Thomas had
not made any findings on the possible unconscionability of the
contracts, the court of appeals remanded the case for further
proceedings.
1. ABSENCE OF MEANINGFUL CHOICE
The first component of unconscionability-absence of mean-
ingful choice-is often referred to as procedural unconscionability,
while substantive unconscionability refers to harsh or one-sided
clauses or terms in the contract." Procedural unconscionability is
determined by examining the bargaining powers of the parties to
the contract." This type of unconscionability denotes deceptive,
high-pressure, and unfair tactics in obtaining the contract commit-
ment. 7 Evidence of such unconscionability is found in the circum-
stances surrounding the formation or execution of a contract. It
may arise from the complainant's lack of knowledge or under-
standing of the contractual terms," or from the lack of meaningful
choice in the terms of the contract caused by unequal bargaining
61. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
62. Id. at 447.
63. Id. at 449.
64. Id. at 450.
65. See Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 260, 544 P.2d 20, 23 (1975).
66. 350 F.2d at 449.
67. Catalina, The Unconscionability Doctrine in Leaseholds, 6 REAL ESTATE L.J. 61
(1977).
68. See Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 447-50. See also notes 61-64 and accompanying
text supra. In considering whether the contract was procedurally unconscionable the court
asked: "Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have
a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important
terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices?" Id. at
449.
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power, as in an adhesion contract. 9
In an early case involving procedural unconscionability, Stone
v. Moody,70 Moody entered into a contract to purchase land from
Stone. The contract provided that Moody could sell any portion of
the purchased land. Without Stone's knowledge, Moody inserted a
clause in the contract which stated that Stone would accept any
land sales contracts entered into by Moody as cash payment for
Moody's purchase. Moody had previously assured Stone that such
a provision would not be included. 1 The court rescinded the con-
tract and stated that the added provision, as a matter of law, ren-
dered "the contract obnoxious to every sense of fairness, honesty,
and right, and is such as to make its enforcement clearly
unconscionable.
'72
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,7 8 is an example of pro-
cedural unconscionability by means of an adhesion contract. Hen-
ningsen purchased an automobile manufactured by Chrysler. The
purchase contract used by the dealer was a printed form, with the
warranty used in the automobile industry74 set forth on the reverse
side. The court held that the warranty, which stated that it was
expressly in lieu of all warranties express or implied, was invalid.75
The court stated that such a provision showed the grossly unequal
bargaining position occupied by the consumer in the automobile
industry, since the automobile buyer could not go anywhere else to
negotiate for better protection.
2. CONTRACT TERMS UNREASONABLY FAVORABLE TO THE OTHER
PARTY
The second component of unconscionability, contract terms
unreasonably favorable to the other party, or substantive uncon-
scionability,7 refers to overly harsh or unfair terms in the contract.
The factors which tend to establish substantive unconscionability
include a one-sided agreement, excessive price, and terms that de-
69. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See
also notes 73-76 and accompanying text infra.
70. 41 Wash. 680, 84 P. 617 (1906).
71. Id. at 683, 84 P. at 618.
72. Id. at 686, 84 P. at 619.
73. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
74. Id. at 366, 161 A.2d at 73-74.
75. Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
76. Id.
77. 86 Wash. 2d at 260, 544 P.2d at 23.
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part from practice prevalent in the trade.7"
Jones v. Star Credit Corp.9  illustrates substantive
unconscionability. There, the court found a contract unconsciona-
ble because of price-value disparity and gross inequality of bar-
gaining power. 80 The plaintiff in Jones, a welfare recipient, agreed
to purchase a home freezer unit for $900 from a door-to-door sales-
man. Added to the cost of the freezer were charges for time credit,
credit life insurance, credit property insurance and sales tax, mak-
ing the total purchase price $1,234.80. There was uncontroverted
proof at trial that the freezer had a maximum retail value of ap-
proximately $300.81 The court held that the price-value disparity
alone was enough to make the contract unconscionable. The very
limited financial resources of the purchaser, known to the seller at
the time, only increased the unconscionability. In the context of
grossly unequal bargaining power, the great disparity between
price and value precluded the buyer from making a meaningful
choice. 2
In contrast to Star Credit Corp., a Florida court in Mobile
America Corp. v. Howard8 found that an 11.75% interest rate on
an installment sales contract was not unconscionable.8 ' In Howard,
the seller of a mobile home sought to replevy the home because of
the buyers' default on their payments. The trial court had refused
to grant the sellers relief, finding that the installment sales con-
tract under which the mobile home was purchased was unconscion-
able, in calling for an annual interest rate of 11.75%.88 The appel-
late court reversed, holding that the 11.75% rate was not uncon-
scionable, since it was within the limits of current installment sales
interest rates. Moreover, the court noted that most cases which
find unconscionability require, in addition to grossly excessive
price, some element of nondisclosure, fraud, overreaching, or une-
qual bargaining position."
78. Catalina, supra note 67, at 61.
79. 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
80. Id. at 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 266-67.
81. Id. at 190, 298 N.Y.S,2d at 264-65.
82. Id. at 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 266-67. See also American Home Improvement, Inc. v.
MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964) (the Supreme Court of New Hampshire found a
contract to paint and install windows and a door unconscionable; the total price of the con-
tract was $2,568.60, of which $809.60 was interest and carrying charges and $800 was a sales-
man's commission).
83. 307 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
84. Id. at 507-08.
85. Id. at 507.
86. Id. at 508.
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There has been no reported appellate decision in Florida using
the unconscionability argument offensively to set aside a contract.
Florida courts have provided relief from unconscionable contracts
or contractual provisions only where unconscionability was raised
as a defense in an action to enforce a contract. Nonetheless, an
analysis of the cases that have used the unconscionability concept
in a defensive manner illustrates that the court's ability to provide
relief from an unconscionable contract is confined to a narrow set
of circumstances.
8 7
Florida courts have provided relief from contractual undertak-
ings only in situations in which fraud, deception, undue influence,
overreaching, or oppression were pleaded and proved.88 A court
will not set aside a merely improvident contract when the facts are
equally available to both parties at the time of contracting.8 9 In
Hirschman v. Hodges, O'Hara & Russell Co.9 0 the buyer of tur-
pentine property complained that the seller had fraudulently mis-
represented the size of the land and the quantity of turpentine
timber.91 The evidence revealed, however, that the price of turpen-
tine spirits had declined in value after the complainant purchased
the land.92 The Supreme Court of Florida held that the buyer had
had the opportunity to examine thoroughly every acre of the land
and that although the contract might have been improvident, the
court could void it only if there were unfair surprise, mistake, un-
due influence, or suppression of the truth."
Even though the parties to a contract may be inexperienced in
business, if the record discloses arm's length dealing, the parties
are charged with all the knowledge they might have received had
they made a complete inquiry.94 In Peacock Hotel, Inc. v. Ship-
man" the defendants appealed from a foreclosure decree, alleging
that the plaintiffs had obtained the mortgage by fraudulent in-
87. Memorandum for Defendants at 25, Royal Coast Condominium Ass'n v. J. & W.
Inv., Inc., No. 76-5367 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. March 1, 1978).
88. See, e.g., Savage v. Home, 159 Fla. 301, 31 So. 2d 477 (1947); Squires v. Citrus Fruit
Prods., Inc., 140 Fla. 253, 191 So. 455 (1939); Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 193 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1967); Florida
Sportservice, Inc, v. City of Miami, 121 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. dismissed, 125 So.
2d 880 (Fla. 1960).
89. Hirshman v. Hodges, O'Hara & Russell Co., 59 Fla. 517, 51 So. 550 (1910).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 518-19, 51 So. at 551.
92. Id. at 526, 51 So. at 554.
93. Id.




ducement. Defendants claimed that they had been told that the
hotel they purchased had sixty rooms, when it actually had only
fifty-six, and that the roof was in good repair, when in fact it was
leaking.9 6 The Supreme Court of Florida refused to set aside the
contract, because it did not involve an unjust and unfair advan-
tage. Both of the parties could have made a diligent and complete
inquiry into these matters."
B. Unconscionability Under the Florida Uniform Commerical
Code
Although Florida's Uniform Commerical Code" does not ap-
ply to leases, 99 its provisions concerning unconscionability are in-
structive for the application of the theory to recreation leases. Sec-
tion 672.302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconsciona-
ble clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconsciona-
ble clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the con-
tract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence
as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court
in making the determination. 100
This section does not, however, define "unconscionability."
The comments to section 672.302 indicate that the basic test for
unconscionability is whether "the clauses involved are so one-sided
as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the
time of the making of the contract. . . .The principle is one of the
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise . ..and not of dis-
turbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
96. Id. at 636, 138 So. at 45.
97. Id. at 639, 138 So. at 46.
98. FLA. STAT. ch. 671-679 (1979).
99. Id. § 672.102 provides that chapter 672, Sales, applies only to transactions in goods.
100. FLA. STAT. § 672.302. The comments to FLA. STAT. ANN. (West 1966) distinguish
Florida case law on unconscionability from § 672.302. The latter does not require a court to
find fraud or deception in order to hold a contract unconscionable. Florida case law, how-
ever, permits buyers and sellers to contract "as they please, no matter how hard the bargain,
in the absence of fraud." Id. Nonetheless, the comments indicate that courts have not
viewed this code section as an excessive grant of power to courts to rewrite contracts. Id.
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power."' 01
Whether a contract contains elements of unfair surprise de-
pends on several factors. One must examine what the relationship
of the parties was, whether the buyer sought out the seller or vice
versa, what sales techniques were involved, whether a form con-
tract was used, and how unexpected such a clause was in the par-
ticular kind of contract.10'
Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., Inc.,0° is illustrative of
the element of unfair surprise in a lease situation. In Seabrook, the
lessor presented the lessee with a complex lease, containing fifty-
four clauses and printed in small type,"0 4 the term to commence on
March 1, 1972. The lease provided, however, that if the building
was not finished on that date, the term would begin on the comple-
tion date. Four months after the lease was to begin, the lessor told
the lessee that the building would be ready for occupancy in two
days. Meanwhile, the lessee had been forced to seek shelter else-
where. The lessor refused to cancel the lease, stating that the
clauses contained within the lease controlled what would happen
in the event of late completion. 05
The court in Seabrook, although acknowledging that the Uni-
form Commercial Code section 2-302 did not apply, used it by
analogy to find the construction clauses unconscionable.' The
court held that "an expert cannot hide behind legal clauses of this
kind when dealing with an occasional lessee that has neither a
knowledge of real estate law nor the advice of legal counsel.'
07
III. APPLICATION OF THE UNCONSCIONABILITY THEORY TO
CONDOMINIUM RECREATION LEASES
A. Recent Florida Cases
In Bennett v. Behring Corp.,0 8 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida applied both common
law and statutory'0 principles of unconscionability to a deed re-
striction challenge and found that the unconscionability argument
101. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.302, Comment 1 (West 1966).
102. R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES 128 (1970).
103. 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
104. Id. at 10, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
105. Id. at 7, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 68-69.
106. Id. at 8-12, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 70-73.
107. Id. at 12, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
108. 466 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
109. FLA. STAT. § 672.302 (1979).
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was not viable.110 Bennett did not involve a condominium recrea-
tion lease plan; nonetheless, the analysis of a recreation lease ar-
rangement in a development of single-family homes is instructive.
In Bennett, the original developer had provided various recrea-
tional facilities for each single-family home community in the City
of Tamarac. The deed restrictions filed by the developer required
all homeowners to be lessees of their community recreational facil-
ity.1 For the use and maintenance of the facilities the homeown-
ers paid fees to the developer according to the terms of the recrea-
tion leases, some of which contained escalation clauses. Plaintiffs
filed a class action against the developer on behalf of all Tamarac
homeowners, " ' alleging that the deed restrictions on the recrea-
tional facilities were unconscionable, unreasonable, and violative of
Florida law and public policy. The court characterized the plain-
tiffs' reliance on dicta from Fleeman,18 Avila, " 4 and Point East
One Condominium Corp."' as an "attempt to fashion the silk
purse of the unenforceability of their contracts."1 6
In applying the two-part procedural test of Walker-Thomas,"
7
the court found no procedural unconscionability." 8 The plaintiffs
had claimed fraud in the contract formation process on two
grounds. First, the developer had failed to disclose the legal ramifi-
cations of the deed restrictions in its newspaper advertisements.
Second, the plaintiffs had not received their deeds containing the
restrictions until after the closing of the real estate transaction. 1 9
The court, however, rejected both arguments, noting that the deed
restrictions were recorded and "were a matter of public record long
prior to closing, and the individual deeds themselves specifically
remind plaintiffs of their duty thereunder. " 20
The court also rejected plaintiffs' allegations of substantive
110. 466 F. Supp. at 694-700.
111. Id. at 692.
112. Id. at 691.
113. Fleeman v. Case, 342 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976); see notes 39-42 and accompanying
text, supra.
114. Avila S. Condominium Ass'n v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977); see notes
44-46 and accompanying text supra.
115. Point E. One Condominium Corp., v. Point E. Developers, Inc., 348 So. 2d 32 (Fla.
3d DCA 1977); see notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra.
116. 466 F. Supp. at 694.
117. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see notes
61-64 and accompanying text supra.
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unconscionability, which were based, inter alia, on the theory of
gross price-value disparity, i.e., excessive rents.121 That the lessor
was making too much money did not lead to substantive uncon-
scionability.1 2 "A contract, fair when entered into, does not there-
after become unconscionable simply because a great many other
persons enter into identical contracts with defendant thereby in-
creasing defendants' profits. 12' The court framed the issue as not
whether "the lessor-seller is making too much money?" but
whether "the lessee-buyer is paying an amount grossly in excess of
what other similarly situated are paying for the same thing?
1 2 4
The court addressed the escalation clause challenge and found
the clause not substantively unconscionable as a matter of law.12
Furthermore, the clause had to be tested as of the time the con-
tract was entered into; if the clause was fair at that time, the plain-
tiffs could not seek judicial relief from a bargain later determined
to be unfair.12 6 Moreover, in this case the escalation clause was not
hidden from the plaintiffs. The argument of Henningsen1 2 7 based
on finding an adhesion contract or unconscionability did not apply
in the Bennett situation, because as the court pointed out, if "a
buyer is free to engage in comparative shopping a contract will not
be held unconscionable on the grounds of price alone."'2
Similarly, the court quickly disposed of the plaintiffs' conten-
tion that it was unconscionable for their property to be subject to a
lien. "It is so well known as to require no citation of authority that
liens may be placed on land to secure payment of a debt." 2 '
In the case of Cohen v. Commodore Plaza at Century 21 Con-
dominium Association,10 which had been remanded by the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Third District,181 for further findings on the
issue of unconscionability, the lower court upheld a ninety-nine
121. Id. Plaintiffs also based their claim of substantive unconscionability on two other
theories: "the onerous and oppressive effect of the escalator clause contained in the leases;
and the unconscionability of having their property subject to a lien." Id.
122. Id. at 698.
123. Id.
124. Id. Judge Gonzalez stressed that the plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence of what
similar facilities charged. Instead, the plaintiffs "simply compare the total value of the rents
being paid to the value of the property being used." Id.
125. Id. at 699.
126. Id.
127. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); see notes 73-76 and accompanying text supra.
128. 466 F. Supp. at 699-700.
129. Id. at 700.
130. No. 73-6939 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. March 30, 1979).
131. 350 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1978).
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year condominium recreation lease by applying the Bennett 2
analysis. 33 In Commodore Plaza, the lessor sued the condominium
association for the recovery of recreation lease payments. 34 The
condominium association responded that the ninety-nine year
lease was entered into at a time when the developer, condominium
asssociation, and unit owners were all the same; therefore, there
was no arm's length bargaining. The association also argued that
the information given to the unit owners was incomplete and insuf-
ficient, and that there was an unreasonable relationship between
the value of the property and the profit return to the lessors.38'
Finding that the unit owners had full knowledge of both the
ninety-nine year recreation lease and the escalation clause at the
time of contracting, the court held that if the lease was fair when
entered into, subsequent events could not make it unfair. 186 The
court then adopted, almost verbatim, the unconscionability analy-
sis of Bennett.3 7 The condominium association "failed to carry its
burden to show any matters which would establish any fraud, un-
fair surprise, oppression, or inability for any unit owner to have
determined the existence and legal ramifications of the 99 year
lease and the escalation clause therein."3 8s Moreover, the court
noted that the parties had stipulated that the ninety-nine year
lease and the escalation clause were not hidden from the unit
purchasers. 3 9
B. Statutory Presumption of Unconscionability of Certain
Leases
On July 1, 1977, section 718.122 of the Florida Statutes, a pro-
vision directed at long-term recreation leases, became effective.
Section 718.122, however, merely creates a rebuttable presumption
of unconscionability and not a cause of action.
It is the intent of the Legislature that this section is reme-
dial and does not create any new cause of action to invalidate
any condominium lease, but shall operate as a statutory pre-
132. Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Fla. 1979); see notes 108-29 and
accompanying text supra.
133. No. 73-6939, slip op. at 2-6.
134. Id. at 1.
135. Id. at 2.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 2-6.
138. Id. at 4-5.
139. Id. at 7.
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scription on procedural matters in actions brought on one or
more causes of action existing at the time of the execution of
such lease. "
Section 718.122 acknowledges that many recreation leases were en-
tered into by parties representing the interests of the developer at
a time when the unit owners were not in control of the condomin-
ium.1" Thus, "[sluch leases often contain numerous obligations on
the part of either . . . a condominium association [or] condomin-
ium unit owners [or both,] with relatively few obligations on the
part of the lessor.142
Simply put, section 718.122 sets out certain elements which, if
all are met, presumptively make the recreation lease unconsciona-
ble.14 3 The statutory elements of unconscionability incorporate
some of the complaints generally asserted by plaintiffs who chal-
140. FLA. STAT. § 718.122(2) (1979).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. § 718.122(1) provides:
(1) A lease pertaining to use by condominium unit owners of recreational or
other common facilities, irrespective of the date on which such lease was entered
into, is presumptively unconscionable if all of the following elements exist:
(a) The lease was executed by persons none of whom at the time of the
execution of the lease were elected by condominium unit owners, other than the
developer, to represent their interests;
(b) The lease requires either the condominium association or the condomin-
ium unit owners to pay real estate taxes on the subject real property;
(c) The lease requires either the condominium association or the condomin-
ium unit owners to insure buildings or other facilities on the subject real prop-
erty against fire or any other hazard;
(d) The lease requires either the condominium association or the condomin-
ium unit owners to perform some or all maintenance obligations pertaining to
the subject real property or facilities located upon the subject real property;
(e) The lease requires either the condominium association or the condomin-
ium unit owners to pay rents to the lessor for a period of 21 years or more;
(f) The lease provides that failure of the lessee to make payments of rents
due under the lease either creates, establishes, or permits establishment of a lien
upon individual condominium units of the condominium to secure claims for
rent;
(g) The lease requires an annual rental which exceeds 25 percent of the ap-
praised value of the leased property as improved, provided that, for purposes of
this paragraph, "annual rental" means the amount due during the first 12
months of the lease for all units, regardless of whether such units were in fact
occupied or sold during that period, and "appraised value" means the appraised
value placed upon the leased property the first tax year after the sale of a unit in
the condominium;
(h) The lease provides for a periodic rental increase based upon reference to
a price index; and
(i) The lease or other condominium documents require that every transferee
of a condominium unit must assume obligations under the lease.
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lenge recreation leases.""' But four of the elements listed in section
718.122(1) are, in fact, required by the Condominium Act itself.
Thus, the rebuttable presumption of unconscionability creates a
"catch-22" situation: if one follows the guidelines of the Condo-
minium Act in drafting a recreation lease, he is building a rebutta-
ble presumption that such a lease is unconscionable.
For example, one element of the presumption of unconsciona-
bility is a lease executed by persons, none of whom were elected by
non-developer unit owners to represent their interests. 145 The
mechanics of establishing a condominium under the Act, however,
require that persons other than unit owners execute the recreation
lease. Section 718.114 stipulates that such leases must be stated
and fully described in the declaration of condominium. 4" A condo-
minium is not created until after a declaration of condominium is
recorded in the public records of the county where the land is lo-
cated.147 Accordingly, because a recreation lease must be recorded
when the declaration of condominium is recorded, the lease is exe-
cuted before the condominium entity exists, at a time when the
developer is the only association member. A second element of the
statutory presumption of unconscionability is satisfied if the lease
requires rental payments for a period of twenty-one or more
years. ' 48 The Condominium Act, however, mandates that a recrea-
tion lease have an unexpired term of at least fifty years.' 9 A lease
that permits the association to place a lien on individual condo-
minium units because of the failure of the lessee to make lease
rental payments gives rise to a third element of the unconsciona-
bility presumption. 150 If the lessor is the condominium association,
however, the Condominium Act expressly provides for such a lien
144. See notes 28-58 and accompanying text supra.
145. FLA. STAT. § 718.122(1)(a) (1979).
146. Id. § 718.114. The statute does provide that declaration may authorize the associa-
tion to acquire leaseholds after execution of the declaration. Because the developer is usu-
ally the one executing the declaration, however, the alternative of allowing the association to
purchase or lease recreation facilities after unit owners become association members is un-
likely to be viable.
147. Id. § 718.104(2).
148. Id. § 718.122(1)(e).
149. Id. § 718.401 provides:
A condominium may be created on lands held by a developer under lease or
may include recreational facilities or other common elements or commonly used
facilities on a leasehold, if, on the date the first unit is conveyed by the devel-
oper to a bona fide purchaser, the lease has an unexpired term of at least 50
years ....
150. Id. § 718.122(1)(f).
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on each condominium parcel for unpaid assessments. 151
A fourth element of unconscionability appears when the lease
or another condominium document requires that every transferee
of a condominium unit assume obligations under the lease.152 This
element, too, is required under the Condominium Act. Section
718.116(2) provides that the liability for assessments, such as rec-
reation lease rentals, cannot be avoided by waiver of the use or
enjoyment of any of the common elements."' Section 718.107(1)
also provides that the undivided share of the common elements
appurtenant to a unit cannot be separated from it and must pass
with title to the unit.
1"
Whether required by other sections of the Act or inspired by
the developer, all the elements are necessary to raise a presump-
tion of unconscionability. 15 Nonetheless, the presumption may be
rebutted by a lessor upon the showing of additional facts and cir-
cumstances to justify and confirm what otherwise appears uncon-
scionable. 156 In Urbanek v. Kandell" 2 the presumption of uncon-
scionability of section 718.122 was rebutted when owners of a
recreation lease and recreational facilities sued to enforce the pay-
ment of monies due under the lease. The condominium association
defended the action by asserting that the lease was unconscionable
and unenforceable. 58 Defendants introduced evidence to prove the
existence of the factors giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of
unconscionability under section 718.122(1).15 The court, in con-
cluding that the presumption of unconscionability had been rebut-
ted, made the following findings:
151. Id. § 718.116(4)(a); see note 25 and accompanying text supra.
152. Id. § 718.122(1)(i).
153. Id. § 718.116(2).
154. Id. § 718.107(1).
155. Id. § 718.122(1).
156. Id. § 718.122(2). The Attorney General of Florida initiated rule-making proceed-
ings regarding unconscionable service contracts under the Little FTC Act. See Unconsciona-
ble Recreation Service Contracts; Rule No. 2-25, Fla. Admin. Weekly, May 27, 1977, at 2.
Proposed chapter 2-25 declares: "It shall be an unfair and deceptive act or practice for any
person to collect or attempt to collect rental payments or portions thereof under a recrea-
tional services contract which is unconscionable at common law." Proposed Rule 2-25.03,
Department of Legal Affairs, State of Florida. On November 1, 1977, a partial final order
was entered by the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings, sitting as hearing
examiner. Such order stated that should the unconscionability rules be made effective, they
could only be applied prospectively since retroactive application would violate the constitu-
tional prohibition against impairment of contracts.
157. No. 75-542-CA (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. Aug. 26, 1977).
158. Id., slip op. at 3.
159. Id. at 4.
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(a) No evidence- was adduced at trial raising any question
that there was a lack of knowledge of the obligation to pay rent
on the recreation lease ....
(b) There was no evidence of any fraud or misrepresenta-
tion perpetrated on the Condominium Association at the time
the lease was executed.
(c) The document contains no fine print, was presented in
ordinary type style, is easily readable, and is not difficult for the
average person to understand.
(d) The Lease was relatively standard in form and content
as those in use at the time of its execution and none of the pro-
visions thereof violated the law as it existed at the time of its
execution.
(f) The Court. .. believes that the facilities are somewhat
plush and are a fair value for the rents charged when compared
to the prevailing community standards for like facilities in exis-
tence at the time of the execution of the lease ....
(g) That at the time of the sales of condominium units there
were other projects available in the. . . South Florida area both
with and without recreational leases and that the same were
available.
(h) That the required disclosures were made in accordance
with the Condominium Act in effect at the time the condomin-
ium units were sold.1 "
The court in Urbanek also noted that notwithstanding section
718.122, the doctrine of unconscionability rests on equitable con-
siderations solely within the province of the court.1 61 The court did
not limit its determination of unconscionability to the elements de-
lineated in the presumption statute, but examined the facts and
circumstances surrounding the transaction itself. The court looked
to the language in the recreation lease and the declaration, the
general business practices in effect when the documents were cre-
ated, the average intelligence, economic status, and bargaining
power of the parties to the contract, and the applicable statutes in
effect at the time the documents were signed.
162
Moreover, the court stated that section 718.122, running
afoul of State constitutional standards of substantive due pro-
cess [and] prohibitions against impairment of contractual obli-
gations, constitutes an impermissible incursion by a politically
160. Id. at 3-4.
161. Id. at 4.
162. Id.
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motivated legislature into the judicial province of the Court, and
may constitute the adoption of a prohibited "rule of practice
and procedure" in violation of the province of the Supreme
Court under Article V of the Florida Constitution . . . the ele-
ments set forth [in section 718.122] do not bear a reasonable
relationship to the doctrine of unconscionability as exists in this
State. 68
C. Old Recreation Leases and New Statutory Provisions
As pointed out in Urbanek, when examining a recreation lease
for unconscionability, a court must view a lease in light of the stat-
utes in effect and the circumstances existing at the time the parties
entered into it.16' This principle has been recbgnized in the major-
ity of cases dealing with unconscionability of contracts.16 5 While
the great majority of recreation leases became effective in the pe-
riod from 1965 to 1971,160 the amendments to the Condominium
Act concerning unconscionability did not become law until 1974
and thereafter. Thus, these provisions become relevant only for
leases entered into after 1973.
Effective October 1, 1974, the Condominium Act stipulates
that before a developer can offer to sell units in a condominium
containing more than twenty residential units, he must prepare a
prospectus or offering circular. 67 This prospectus must give fuller
disclosure before sale than the previous statute required.168 The
circular must describe the recreation facility, the lease term and
price, and the option to buy, if one is included. 69 Additionally, the
front cover or first page of the prospectus must contain the follow-
ing statements in bold type:
1. This prospectus (offering circular) contains important mat-
163. Id. at 5. For a discussion of the supreme court's rulemaking power, see Kramer,
Halpern & Robbins, Constitutional Law, 1979 Developments in Florida Law, 34 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 597, 602-08 (1980).
164. Urbanek, slip op. at 5.
165. See, e.g., Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689, 698 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Wil-
liams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
166. Lewis & Zenz, supra note 12, at 21.
167. FLA. STAT. § 711.69 (1974) (current version at §§ 718.503, .504 (1979)).
168. FLA. STAT. § 711.24 (1973).
169. Id. § 711.69 (1974) (current version at §§ 718.503, .504 (1979)). If there is a recrea-
tion lease, the following statement is to appear in conspicuous type: THERE IS A RECRE-
ATION FACILITIES LEASE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CONDOMINIUM. If the unit
owner must pay a fee under such a lease, that fact must also appear in conspicuous type in a




ters to be considered in acquiring a condominium unit.
2. The statements contained herein are only summary in na-
ture. A prospective purchaser should refer to all references, all
exhibits hereto, the contract documents, and sales materials.
3. Oral representations cannot be relied upon as correctly stat-
ing the representations of the developer. Refer to this prospec-
tus (offering circular) and its exhibits for correct
representations.
1 7 0
The next page of the prospectus must contain all statements
required to be in conspicuous type, including whether, as a condi-
tion of ownership, the unit owners are required to be lessees,
whether rent is charged, and whether a lien right is permitted
against each unit to secure payment of rent. The prospectus also
must indicate whether there is to be a management contract for
the condominium, whether the developer has the right to retain
control of the association after a majority of the units have been
sold, and whether the sale, lease, or transfer of units is restricted
or controlled.17 1 Section 711.66(5)(e), also effective in 1974, re-
quires that any lease made by an association prior to assumption
of control by unit owners must be fair and reasonable.
7
1
In 1977, the legislature provided the unit owner with two
methods of release from an unconscionable recreation lease: section
718.122, 73 which creates the rebuttable presumption of uncon-
scionability, and section 718.401(6)(a), which provides unit owners
with an option to purchase the recreation lease on any anniversary
date after the tenth year of the lease.'
74
The Condominium Acts that have become effective since 1974
have served to protect unit owners in a way that the old assump-
tion in sales, "caveat emptor," never did. Not only do the statutes
treat the unit owner as a layman, requiring full disclosure in a pro-
spectus or offering circular before sale, but they are written to in-
sure fairness in leases that are entered into by parties with unequal
bargaining power. Furthermore, in recent acts, the legislature has
addressed the possible unfairness of recreation leases by requiring
170. Id. § 718.504(1)(b).
171. Id. "If a developer, in good faith, has attempted to comply with the requirements
of this part, and if, in fact, he has substantially complied with the disclosure requirement of
this chapter, nonmaterial errors or omissions in the disclosure materials shall not be action-
able." Id. § 718.505 (1979).
172. Id. § 711.66(5)(e) (1974); see note 45 and accompanying text supra.
173. Id. § 718.122 (1979); see notes 140-44 and accompanying text supra.
174. Id. § 718.401(6)(a). The price of the buy-out is to be determined by agreement of
the parties. If there is no agreement as to price, the price shall be determined by arbitration.
1980]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
conspicuous disclosure if the purchase includes such a lease, and
by creating new remedies for unit owners.
IV. COMMONLY HELD MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT
RECREATION LEASES
As previously pointed out, recreation leases have often been
looked on with disfavor by the Florida community. Because many
misconceptions have developed concerning such leases, the Florida
Division of Land Sales and Condominiums commissioned a
study175 to be done on the recreation lease in Florida. Authors
John Lewis and Gary Zenz made numerous findings in their study
that help to dispel many of the untruths associated with the recre-
ation lease. Much of their analysis is helpful to prove that recrea-
tion leases are not generally unconscionable.
The first of these myths is that recreation leases do not lower
the front end cost of the condominium unit. Evidence indicates
that the use of the lease does lower the cost of the condominium
unit by approximately thirteen percent. Developers can charge a
lower initial amount for the units by deferring to later years their
foregone profits in the form of lease payments.1' Thus, from the
consumer's viewpoint, the lease enables the unit purchaser to in-
vest less initially and still obtain the recreational amenities appur-
tenant to his unit by paying a monthly rental. The recreation lease
may be viewed as a financing device similar to a second mortgage,
allowing the consumer to spread over time the cost of his recrea-
tion facilities,17 7  while allowing the developer a continuing
income. 7 8
As pointed out earlier, the purchaser of a lease with an escala-
tion clause tied to a Consumer Price Index may not have foreseen
the near doubling of his monthly lease rental.7 9 An indexed escala-
tion clause, however, is intended to act as an inflation hedge for
175. Lewis & Zenz, supra note 12.
176. Id. at 29. For example, Plaza Del Prado in North Miami Beach, a 624-unit condo-
minium, reported gross sales of $22,406,289; however, the net profit before federal income
tax totalled $1,148,349, or 5.12%. This profit of approximately 5% must be compared with
the norm of 20% that is usually made on such a project. The Plaza Del Prado project also
involved a 99-year recreational lease with payments of $224,640 per year which enabled the
developers to keep the front end unit costs to 5.12%. See note 187 and accompanying text
infra.
177. Id. at 11.
178. Id. at 17-18.
179. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
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the developer, who must wait for his deferred profit.180 Such a re-
sult may not be unjustified if it is understood that the developer
could have demanded his total profit up front by charging higher
unit prices.
A second commonly held misconception about the recreation
lease is that escalation clauses are unique to the condominium rec-
reation lease situation. Escalation clauses have traditionally been
used in the real estate field whenever long-term leases were in-
volved. Most leases of nonresidential space include provisions for
the escalation of rent. These clauses distribute the liability for es-
calation of costs among all the tenants of a building or a shipping
center, who usually share the liability on a pro rata basis according
to the amount of space they are leasing.' 81
Escalation clauses tied to cost-of-living indexes are often used
in commercial and ground leases.18 2 Increases both in a landlord's
operating expenses and in real estate taxes may be factors in rent
escalation, in addition to the increase in cost of living. It is not
uncommon for commercial leases to require the lessee to pay main-
tenance and insurance expenses, which act as a "tax stop" and
have the effect of shielding the lessor from property tax
increases.'
A third myth regarding recreation leases is that consumers
prefer not to be bound by a such a lease. Evidence suggests that if
given a choice, consumers will exercise the recreation lease option.
For example, purchasers at Century Village West in Boca Raton
and Century Village East in Deerfield Beach, were given the option
of executing a recreation lease or forfeiting the right to, use the
recreation facilities. Of the 6,000 units sold with this option, not
one purchaser chose to avoid the recreation lease.184 In fact, the
recreation lease is readily acceptable to Florida unit owners, many
of whom buy condominiums in Florida to have a second home for
180. Lewis & Zenz, supra note 12, at 16.
181. Id. at 28.
182. Id. at 28. See also 1 M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES 83-99 (1974). For an ex-
ample of a commercial lease with an escalation clause, see Pittsburgh Allied Fabricators,
Inc. v. Haber, 440 Pa. 545, 271 A.2d 217 (1970).
183. Lewis & Zenz, supra note 12, at 28.
184. Id. at 30. At the Highpoint of Delray Beach, unit purchasers of approximately
1400 units were given the option of executing a recreation lease or paying a higher price for
the unit and avoiding the lease. The higher price was $1,800 for the one-bedroom unit and
$2,400 for the two-bedroom unit. The recreation lease was a 99-year net-net-net lease with-
out an escalation provision. The annual lease rental for a one-bedroom unit was $180 and
for a two-bedroom unit, $240. The developer indicated that less than 20% of all purchasers
elected to pay the higher price and avoid the lease. Id.
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vacations or to spend retirement years in a warm climate. Purchas-
ers usually desire the resort recreation facilities provided for by the
leases and appurtenant to their condominium units. Additionally,
the clubhouse, which is often one of the recreation lease amenities,
offers lessees a desirable social environment. 8 Condominium rec-
reation facilities are easily accessible and naturally limit the num-
ber of users to the unit owners and their guests. Instead of paying
a membership fee to a private country club, the unit purchasers
pay a monthly recreation lease fee.
Statistics show that only sixty percent of the condominiums in
Florida have recreation leases. Whether comparable facilities are
provided by the other forty percent of the condominiums is an im-
portant consideration. In evaluating a recreation lease, one must
confront the possibility that on the open market there might not
be similar facilities-that is, accessible facilities with a limited
membership-available at a comparable cost. 86
Another of the misconceptions regarding the recreation lease
is that the developer's profits are unconscionable. Before labelling
the return on a recreation lease unconscionable, one must first de-
termine what an unconscionable profit is, taking into account the
risk involved in the venture and the profit to be made on the entire
condominium project. The probable norm of profit realized on a
condominium development is twenty percent. In determining the
total profit from such a development accompanied by a recreation
lease, one must look not only at the profit made on gross sales of
the units, but also at the profit realized from the yearly payments
on the recreation lease.187 For example, in the Plaza Del Prado
Condominium project in North Miami Beach, the pre-tax profit on
gross sales was approximately five percent. When the profits made
on the recreation lease were added to that figure, the developer
realized a fifteen percent before-tax profit, 88 well within the norm
for such a project. To determine if this percentage is unconsciona-
ble, one must take into account that this project took four years to
construct, that the developer had a personal endorsement liability
on $16,500,000 in construction costs over this period, and that the
developer must wait to receive a return on the investment in in-
185. See ROHAN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE (1979).
186. Lewis & Zenz, supra note 12, at 60.
187. Id. at 31.
188. Id. Profit from sales equaled $1,148,349, whereas profit from the lease valued
$2,246,400. To determine the total profit realized from the projects the sum of these figures
was divided by the gross sales of $22,406,289.
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cremental rental payments. Clearly, all the facts in a particular
case must be considered in determining whether profits made on a
condominium development with a recreation lease are uncon-
scionable.
189
The last major misconception about recreation leases is the
likelihood that foreclosures will result when unit owners fail to pay
their monthly rental, or other assessments due for the use, mainte-
nance, upkeep or repair of the recreational facilities.190 The HUD
Condominium and Cooperative Housing Study pointed out this
threat in July 1975 when it predicted: "many foreclosures on indi-
vidual units are possible in the next few years in Florida." ' To
date, however, there has not been one case of foreclosure of a con-
dominium unit in Florida for a unit owner's failure to make timely
lease payments. 92 Moreover, the harshness of foreclosure by the
association is minimized, since the lien right must be conspicuously
detailed in the lease itself and in the prospectus. Thus, the buyer
has notice of the provision and has no justification for claiming
either fraud or unfair surprise.
V. THE STATUS OF THE RECREATION LEASE AND
THE UNCONSCIONABILiTY ARGUMENT IN 1979
A. Unconscionability and the Federal Condominium Act of
1979
Presently, Congress has before it the Condominium Act of
1979.'91 The purpose of the proposed federal legislation is "to es-
tablish national standards for consumer protection and disclosure
together with appropriate enforcement procedures. . . and to cor-
rect and prevent. . . [the] abusive use of long-term leasing of rec-
reation and other condominium-related facilities.' 9
Section 210 of the Senate version' 5 of the Condominium Act
concerns civil actions for unconscionable leases. This section per-
mits unit owners, by a vote of not less than two-thirds of the units
189. Id.
190. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
191. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OP HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CONDOMINIUM
AND COOPERATIVE HOUSING STUDY at V-18 to -19 (1975).
192. Lewis & Zenz, supra note 12, at 32.
193. S. 612, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2792, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979). The
bills pending in both the Senate and House of Representatives are companion bills. For
purposes of simplicity, the discussion will refer only to S. 612.
194. S. 612, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 2515 (1979).
195. Id.
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other than units owned by the developer, to seek a judicial deter-
mination that a lease or any portion of a lease is unconscionable, if
the lease has the following attributes:
(1) it was made in connection with a condominium project,
and
(2) it was entered into while the owners association is con-
trolled by the developer through special developer control or be-
cause the developer holds a majority of the votes in the owners
association; and
(3) it had to be accepted or ratified by purchasers or
through the unit owners association as a condition of purchase
of a unit in the condominium project."'
Moreover, if the above three characteristics are established and the
lease
(1) is for a period of more than twenty-one years or is for a
period of less than twenty-one years but contains automatic re-
newal provisions for a period of more than twenty-one years;
and
(2) contains an automatic rent increase clause or creates a
lien subjecting any unit to foreclosure for failure to make pay-
ments; and
(3) contains provisions requiring the lessees to assume all or
substantially all obligations and liabilities associated with main-
tenance and use of the leased property;
then the court will consider the lease to be unconscionable, unless
otherwise proven by clear and convincing evidence under the stan-
dards in subsection (b). 9 7
Subsection (b) provides that in making its determination of
unconscionability, the court shall consider:
(1) any gross disparity between the obligation incurred and
the value of the benefit derived by the lessees, including consid-
eration of (i) the obligations to pay rent, taxes, and insurance,
and to maintain, repair, and replace the property, (ii) the value
of the leased property, (iii) the price at which comparable prop-
erty could have been acquired, and (iv) the lessor's rate of re-
turn on investment . .. ;
(2) the unequal bargaining position of the parties to the
lease;
(3) the adequacy of disclosure of the existence and terms of
196. Id. § 210(a).
197. Id. § 210(c).
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the lease to purchasers and the ability of purchasers to compre-
hend their rights and obligations thereunder;
(4) the identity of interest, if any, of original parties to the
lease; and
(5) subsequent ratification of amendment to the lease,
agreed to by a majority of the unit owners other than the devel-
oper or an affiliate .... 198
Additionally, section 210 provides that escalation clauses as to
future rental increases are unenforceable in a lease having all the
following characteristics:
(1) it contains provisions requiring the lessees to assume all
or substantially all obligations and liabilities associated with
maintenance and use of leased property; and
(2) it 'was entered into while the owners association is con-
trolled by the developer through special developer control or be-
cause the developer holds a majority of votes in the owners asso-
ciation; and
(3) it had to be accepted or ratified by purchasers or
through the unit owners association as a condition of purchase
of a unit in the condominium project.' 9
This provision applies to future increases in rental occurring after
the effective date of the Act.2 00
While both the House of Representatives and the Senate have
held hearings on the proposed Federal Condominium Act, the bill
has not come out of committee.20 1 A comparison of section 210 to
the unconscionability discussion in this article reveals many ana-
lytical conflicts. It is unclear whether the proposed federal Act goes
beyond the provisions of the Florida Condominium Act for a re-
buttable presumption of unconscionability. The federal Act pro-
vides that the court shall consider the factors in subsection 210(c)
and "shall consider the lease to be unconscionable, unless proven
otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. ' '20 2 Significantly, the
federal Act allows the court to make such a declaration of uncon-
scionability before it has examined the bargaining power of the
198. Id. § 210(b).
199. Id. § 210(f).
200. Id. § 210(g).
201. H.R. 2792 was referred to the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Commit-
tee, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development. That subcommittee held
hearings on the proposed act on March 26-30, 1979.
S. 612 was referred to the Senate Banking Committee, Subcommittee on Housing and
Urban Affairs. That subcommittee held hearings on the proposed act on June 28, 1979.
202. S. 612, § 210(c)(3), 125 CONG. REc. 2515 (1979).
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parties, the disclosure documents, the ability of the purchaser to
engage in comparative shopping for a condominium without a
lease, and the monthly rental in comparison to the prevailing com-
munity standards for like facilities. Through such provisions, the
legislative branch is stepping into judicial territory, as suggested
by the Urbanek court,0 3 since the Act does not permit the court to
apply equitable considerations to the doctrine of unconscionability.
Moreover, by prohibiting future increases in rental payments
under current leases which have escalation clauses, Congress leaves
the way open for an argument grounded on the impairment of con-
tractual obligations, as discussed in Fleeman2 04
B. The Recreation Lease Buy-Out
One method by which an undesirable recreation lease can be
terminated is through a buy-out, a contractual arrangement
whereby a condominium association or the individual unit owners
purchase the recreation facilities comprised in the recreation lease
from the developer or third-party lessor.2 05 Thus, a buy-out will
terminate the rent provision of the lease, which in turn will negate
the application of any cost-of-living escalation clause associated
with it. As a result, unit owners will be able to set the amount of
their monthly recreational maintenance fees. From 1970 to 1979,
over one hundred buy-outs took place in Florida2 0 It is apparent,
then, that the buy-out has proven to be a popular means of resolv-
ing recreation lease controversies.
A major problem with the buy-out, however, is the determina-
tion of an agreeable buy-out price or valuation. Lessees typically
view the lease as consisting of the tangible amenities that comprise
the recreation facilities. Thus, they argue that the valuation should
be the replacement cost of the facilities, less depreciation.20 7 On
the other hand, the recreation lease represents to the developer a
valuable leased fee with the present value of a future income
stream for the entire term of the lease. The right to that future
income, not the underlying amenities, is of paramount importance
203. See notes 156-63 and accompanying text supra.
204. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra.
205. Lewis & Zenz, supra note 12, at 84.
206. Id. at 114.
207. Id. at 89. Under the replacement cost approach, the cost of reproducing the ameni-
ties making up the recreational lease package is added to the value of the underlying land.
This valuation, however, merely represents the current fair market value of the reversionary
interest, which is only a part of the total recreational lease value. Id. at 119.
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to the lessor."' 8
Accordingly, the valuation approaches taken by the lessee and
lessor produce greatly different results. The replacement-cost ap-
proach of the lessee fails to take into account the present value of
the lessor's right to future rental payments20 9 The traditional
method of valuation is that of multiplying the annual rental times
ten. This capitalized figure, however, is generally not satisfactory
to the developer.2 1
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether recreation leases are virtuous or unsavory is not at
issue in this article. Rather, the authors have examined the appli-
cability of unconscionability theory and the various misconceptions
surrounding condominium recreation leases. Although myths re-
garding the undesirability of recreation leases are widespread in
Florida, it has never been alleged that an owner has been unable to
resell a unit because of the recreation lease. Indeed, condominiums
with recreation leases are selling in some cases for twice their origi-
nal purchase price. One may reach a realistic perspective on the
recreation lease by evaluating the circumstances surrounding the
particular lease as well as the general trend of condominium devel-
opment in Florida.
The realities of recreation leases simply do not fit into the
dual requirements of unconscionability analysis developed in such
cases as Walker-Thomas211-absence of meaningful choice to-
gether with contract terms unreasonably favorable to the other
party. 1 2 As to the first requirement, the purchaser does have a
choice: he may purchase a condominium with a recreation lease or
choose from the forty percent of Florida condominiums sold with
no recreation lease. " As to the second requirement of unconscion-
ability, it is difficult to argue that the recreation lease contains
208. Id. at 88-89. The income approach takes into consideration the present value of
future rental payments and the reversionary value at the end of the lease. Id. at 122.
209. Id. at 117-19.
210. Id. at 121-22. John R. Lewis and Gary J. Zenz of Florida State University suggest
in their study of condominium recreation leases that the "income approach" is the most
accurate method of valuation. Their income approach model takes into account the value of
the leased land and the reversion. The value of the land is the present value of the net
income stream from the rents. The reversion is the net cash proceeds to the seller from
disposing of the underlying fee, i.e., the land and facilities.
211. 350 F.2d at 445; see notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.
212. See notes 65-97 and accompanying text supra.
213. Lewis & Zenz, supra note 12.
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grossly excessive price terms that unreasonably favor the devel-
oper 2 4 Seen from the consumer-lessee's point of view, the lease is
a substitute for a costly short-term investment for recreation facili-
ties.2 15 This concept must be balanced against the developer-les-
sor's view of the lease as a valuable leased fee with the present
value of a future income stream for the entire term of the lease."
Florida case law requires that in addition to grossly excessive
price terms, some elements of fraud, overreaching, or unequal bar-
gaining position must be present before a contract can be over-
turned.2  Moreover, a purchaser cannot argue that he was unaware
of the recreation lease term when he purchased the condominium.
Purchasers have been placed on constructive notice of the recrea-
tion lease by the requirement that it be filed in the public records
of the appropriate county." 8 Additionally, since 1974, the Condo-
minium Act has required the offering circular to disclose, in bold-
face type, the presence and terms of the recreation lease." 9
Unconscionability arguments have been most effective in situ-
ations involving consumer transactions in which the buyers are
poor, have little education, and either do not bother to read the
contract or are not able to understand it. Purchasers of condomin-
ium units are different. Many come from business-oriented back-
grounds and have the funds to invest in a Florida condominium.
Such purchasers, when given a choice, overwhelmingly prefer a
210Florida condominium with appurtenant recreation facilities.
214. See notes 69 & 185 and accompanying text supra.
215. See note 176 and accompanying text supra.
216. See notes 175 & 177 and accompanying text supra.
217. See notes 83-86 and accompanying text supra.
218. See note 147 and accompanying text supra.
219. See notes 168-70 and accompanying text supra.
220. See note 183 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 34:563
